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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin is a purely online virtual currency, unbacked by ei-
ther physical commodities or sovereign obligation; instead,
it relies on a combination of cryptographic protection and
a peer-to-peer protocol for witnessing settlements. Conse-
quently, Bitcoin has the unintuitive property that while the
ownership of money is implicitly anonymous, its flow is glob-
ally visible. In this paper we explore this unique character-
istic further, using heuristic clustering to group Bitcoin wal-
lets based on evidence of shared authority, and then using
re-identification attacks (i.e., empirical purchasing of goods
and services) to classify the operators of those clusters. From
this analysis, we consider the challenges for those seeking to
use Bitcoin for criminal or fraudulent purposes at scale.
1. INTRODUCTION
Demand for low friction e-commerce of various kinds has
driven a proliferation in online payment systems over the
last decade. Thus, in addition to established payment card
networks (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) a broad range of so-
called “alternative payments” has emerged including eWal-
lets (e.g., Paypal, Google Checkout, and WebMoney), direct
debit systems (typically via ACH, such as eBillMe), money
transfer systems (e.g., Moneygram) and so on. However, vir-
tually all of these systems have the property that they are
denominated in existing fiat currencies (e.g., dollars), explic-
itly identify the payer in transactions, and are centrally or
quasi-centrally administered. (In particular, there is a cen-
tral controlling authority who has the technical and legal
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capacity to tie a transaction back to a pair of individuals.)
By far the most intriguing exception to this rule is Bit-
coin. First deployed in 2009, Bitcoin is an independent on-
line monetary system that combines some of the features of
cash and existing online payment methods. Like cash, Bit-
coin transactions do not explicitly identify the payer or the
payee: a transaction is a cryptographically signed transfer of
funds from one public key to another. Moreover, like cash,
Bitcoin transactions are irreversible (in particular, there is
no chargeback risk as with credit cards). However, unlike
cash, Bitcoin requires third-party mediation: a global peer-
to-peer network of participants validates and certifies all
transactions. Such decentralized accounting requires each
network participant to maintain the entire transaction his-
tory of the system, which even in 2012 amounted to over
3GB of compressed data. Bitcoin identities are thus pseudo-
anonymous: while not explicitly tied to real-world individ-
uals or organizations, all transactions are completely trans-
parent.
This unusual combination of features has given rise to con-
siderable confusion about the nature and consequences of
the anonymity that Bitcoin provides. In particular, there is
concern that the combination of scalable, irrevocable, anony-
mous payments would prove highly attractive for criminals
engaged in fraud or money laundering. In a widely leaked
2012 Intelligence Assessment, FBI analysts make just this
case and conclude that a key “advantage” of Bitcoin for
criminals is that “law enforcement faces difficulties detecting
suspicious activity, identifying users and obtaining transac-
tion records” [5]. Similarly, in a late 2012 report on Virtual
Currency Schemes, the European Central Bank opines that
the lack of regulation and due diligence might enable “crim-
inals, terrorists, fraudsters and money laundering” and that
“the extent to which any money flows can be traced back
to a particular user is unknown” [4]. Indeed, there is at
least some anecdotal evidence that this statement is true,
with the widely publicized Silk Road service using Bitcoin
to trade in a range of illegal goods (e.g., restricted drugs
and firearms). Finally, adding to this urgency is Bitcoin’s
considerable growth, both quantitatively — a merchant ser-
vicer, Bitpay, announced that it had signed up over 1,000
merchants in 2012 to accept bitcoins, and in November 2013
the exchange rate soared to a peak of 1,000 USD per bit-
coin — and qualitatively via integration with existing pay-
ment mechanisms and the increasing attention of world fi-
nancial institutions. In 2012 alone, Bitinstant offered to
tie users’ Bitcoin wallets to Mastercard accounts [3], Bit-
coin Central partnered with the French bank Cre´dit Mutuel
Arke´a to gateway Bitcoin into the banking system [8], Canada
decided to tax Bitcoin transactions [2], and FinCEN issued
regulations on virtual currencies [6]). Despite this back-
ground of intense interest, Bitcoin’s pseudo-anonymity has
limited how much is known about how the currency is used
and how Bitcoin’s use has evolved over time.
In this context, our work seeks to better understand the
traceability of Bitcoin flows. Importantly, our goal is not to
generally de-anonymize all Bitcoin users — as the abstract
protocol design itself dictates that this should be impossi-
ble — but rather to identify certain idioms of use present
in concrete Bitcoin network implementations that erode the
anonymity of the users who engage in them. We stress that
our work was done at a specific point in the evolution of
Bitcoin, and that as idioms of use change, the techniques we
develop may need to adapt as well.
Our approach is based on the availability of the Bitcoin
block chain: a replicated graph data structure that encodes
all Bitcoin activity, past and present, in terms of the pub-
lic digital signing keys party to each transaction. How-
ever, since each of these keys carries no explicit information
about ownership, our analysis depends on imposing addi-
tional structure on the transaction graph.
Our methodology has two phases. First, in Section 3, we
describe a re-identification attack wherein we open accounts
and make purchases from a broad range of known Bitcoin
merchants and service providers. Since one endpoint of the
transaction is known (i.e., we know which public key we
used), we are able to positively label the public key on the
other end as belonging to the service; we augment this at-
tack by crawling Bitcoin forums for“self-labeled”public keys
(e.g., where an individual or organization explicitly adver-
tises a key as their own). Next, in Section 4, we build on
past efforts [1, 9, 10, 12] to cluster public keys based on ev-
idence of shared spending authority. This clustering allows
us to amplify the results of our re-identification attack: if we
labeled one public key as belonging to a particular service,
we can now transitively taint the entire cluster containing
this public key as belonging to that service as well. The
result is a condensed graph, in which nodes represent entire
users and services rather than individual public keys.
From this data, we examine the suitability of Bitcoin for
hiding large-scale illicit transactions. Using the dissolution
of a large Silk Road wallet and notable Bitcoin thefts as case
studies, we argue that an agency with subpoena power would
be well placed to identify who is paying money to whom.
Indeed, we argue that the increasing dominance of a small
number of Bitcoin institutions (most notably services that
perform currency exchange), coupled with the public nature
of transactions and our ability to label monetary flows to
major institutions, ultimately makes Bitcoin unattractive
for high-volume illicit use such as money laundering.
2. BITCOIN BACKGROUND
The heuristics that we use to cluster pseudonyms depend
on the structure of the Bitcoin protocol, so we first describe
it here, and briefly mention the anonymity that it is intended
to provide. Additionally, much of our analysis discusses the
“major players”and different categories of Bitcoin-based ser-
vices, so we also present a more high-level overview of Bit-
coin participation.
2.1 Bitcoin protocol description
Bitcoin is a decentralized electronic currency, introduced
by (the pseudonymous) Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [7] and
deployed on January 3 2009. Briefly, a bitcoin can be thought
of as a chain of transactions from one owner to the next,
where owners are identified by a public key — from here on
out, an address — that serves as a pseudonym; i.e., users can
use any number of addresses and their activity using one set
of addresses is not inherently tied to their activity using
another set, or to their real-world identity. In each trans-
action, the previous owner signs — using the secret signing
key corresponding to his address — a hash of the transac-
tion in which he received the bitcoins and the address of the
next owner. (In fact, transactions can have many input and
output addresses, a fact that we exploit in our clustering
heuristics in Section 4, but for simplicity we restrict our-
selves here to the case of a single input and output.) This
signature (i.e., transaction) can then be added to the set
of transactions that constitutes the bitcoin; because each of
these transactions references the previous transaction (i.e.,
in sending bitcoins, the current owner must specify where
they came from), the transactions form a chain. To verify
the validity of a bitcoin, a user can check the validity of each
of the signatures in this chain.
To prevent double spending, it is necessary for each user
in the system to be aware of all such transactions. Dou-
ble spending can then be identified when a user attempts to
transfer a bitcoin after he has already done so. To deter-
mine which transaction came first, transactions are grouped
into blocks, which serve to timestamp the transactions they
contain and vouch for their validity. Blocks are themselves
formed into a chain, with each block referencing the previous
one (and thus further reinforcing the validity of all previous
transactions). This process yields a block chain, which is
then publicly available to every user within the system.
This process describes how to transfer bitcoins and broad-
cast transactions to all users of the system. Because Bitcoin
is decentralized and there is thus no central authority mint-
ing bitcoins, we must also consider how bitcoins are gener-
ated in the first place. In fact, this happens in the process
of forming a block: each accepted block (i.e., each block in-
corporated into the block chain) is required to be such that,
when all the data inside the block is hashed, the hash begins
with a certain number of zeroes. To allow users to find this
particular collection of data, blocks contain, in addition to
a list of transactions, a nonce. (We simplify the description
slightly to ease presentation.) Once someone finds a nonce
that allows the block to have the correctly formatted hash,
the block is then broadcast in the same peer-to-peer manner
as transactions. The system is designed to generate only 21
million bitcoins in total. Finding a block currently comes
with an attached reward of 25 BTC; this rate was 50 BTC
until November 28 2012 (block height 210,000), and is ex-
pected to halve again in 2016, and eventually drop to 0 in
2140.
The dissemination of information within the Bitcoin net-
work is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: How a Bitcoin transaction works; in this
example, a user wants to send 0.7 bitcoins as pay-
ment to a merchant. In (1), the merchant generates
or picks an address mpk, and in (2) it sends this ad-
dress to the user. In (3), the user forms the transac-
tion tx to transfer the 0.7 BTC from upk to mpk. In
(4), the user broadcasts this transaction to his peers,
which (if the transaction is valid) allows it to flood
the network. In this way, a miner learns about his
transaction. In (5), the miner works to incorporate
this and other transactions into a block by checking
if their hash is within some target range. In (6), the
miner broadcasts this block to her peers, which (if
the block is valid) allows it to flood the network. In
this way, the merchant learns that the transaction
has been accepted into the global block chain, and
thus receives the user’s payment.
2.2 Participants in the Bitcoin network
In practice, the way in which Bitcoin can be used is much
simpler than the above description might indicate. First,
generating a block is so computationally difficult that very
few individual users attempt it on their own. Instead, users
may join a mining pool, in which they contribute “shares” to
narrow down the search space, and earn a small amount of
bitcoins in exchange for each share.
Users may also avoid coin generation entirely, and simply
purchase bitcoins through one of the many exchanges. They
may then keep the bitcoins in a wallet stored on their com-
puter or, to make matters even easier, use a wallet service
(although many wallet services have suffered thefts and been
shut down).
Finally, to actually spend their bitcoins, users could gam-
ble with one of the popular dice games such as Satoshi Dice.
They could also buy items from various online vendors. Fi-
nally, users wishing to go beyond basic currency speculation
can invest their bitcoins with firms such as Bitcoinica (shut
down after a series of thefts) or Bitcoin Savings & Trust
(later revealed as a major Ponzi scheme).
3. DATA COLLECTION
To identify addresses belonging to the types of services
mentioned in Section 2.2, we sought to “tag” as many ad-
dresses as possible; i.e., label an address as being definitively
controlled by some known real-world user. As we will see in
Section 4.1, by clustering addresses based on evidence of
shared control, we can bootstrap off the minimal ground
truth data this provides to tag entire clusters of addresses
as also belonging to that user.
Our predominant method for tagging users was simply
transacting with them (e.g., depositing into and withdraw-
ing bitcoins from Mt. Gox) and then observing the addresses
they used. We additionally collected known (or assumed)
addresses that we found in various forums and other Web
sites, although we regarded this latter kind of tagging as less
reliable than our own observed data.
3.1 From our own transactions
We engaged in 344 transactions with a wide variety of ser-
vices, listed in Table 1, including mining pools, wallet ser-
vices, bank exchanges, non-bank exchanges, vendors, gam-
bling sites, and miscellaneous services.
Mining pools. We mined bitcoins using an AMD Radeon
HD 7970, capable of approximately 530 million SHA-256
computations per second, which allowed us to trigger a pay-
out of at least 0.1 BTC with 11 different pools, anywhere
from 1 to 25 times. For each payout transaction, we then
labeled the input addresses as belonging to the pool.
Wallets. We kept money with most of the major wallet
services (10 in total), and made multiple deposit and with-
drawal transactions for each.
Bank exchanges. Most of the real-time trading ex-
changes (i.e., in which the exchange rate is not fixed) also
function as banks. As such, we tagged these services just as
we did the wallets: by depositing into and withdrawing from
our accounts. We kept accounts with 18 such exchanges in
total.
Non-bank exchanges. In contrast, most of the fixed-
rate exchanges did not function as banks, and are instead
intended for one-time conversions. We therefore were able
to participate in fewer transactions with these exchanges,
although we again tried to transact with most of the major
ones at least once (8 in total).
Vendors. We purchased goods, both physical and digi-
tal, from a wide variety of vendors. Many of the vendors we
interacted with did not use an independent method for ac-
cepting bitcoins, but relied instead on the BitPay payment
gateway (and one used WalletBit as a payment gateway).
We also kept a wallet with Silk Road, which allowed us to
tag their addresses without making any purchases.
Gambling. We kept accounts with five poker sites, and
transacted with eight sites offering mini-games and/or lot-
teries.
Miscellaneous. Four of the additional services we in-
teracted with were mix or laundry services: when provided
with an output address, they promised to send to that ad-
dress coins that had no association with the ones sent to
them; the more sophisticated ones offered to spread the coins
out over various transactions and over time. One of these,
BitMix, simply stole our money, while Bitcoin Laundry twice
sent us our own coins back, indicating we were possibly their
only customer at that time. We also interacted with Bit Vis-
itor, a site that paid users to visit certain sites; Bitcoin Ad-
vertisers, which provided online advertising; CoinAd, which
gave out free bitcoins; Coinapult, which forwarded bitcoins
to an email address, where they could then be redeemed;
and finally, Wikileaks, with whom we donated to both their
Mining
50 BTC BTC Guild Itzod
ABC Pool Deepbit Ozcoin
Bitclockers EclipseMC Slush
Bitminter Eligius
Wallets
Bitcoin Faucet Easywallet Strongcoin
My Wallet Flexcoin WalletBit
Coinbase Instawallet
Easycoin Paytunia
Exchanges
Bitcoin 24 BTC-e Aurum Xchange
Bitcoin Central CampBX BitInstant
Bitcoin.de CA VirtEx Bitcoin Nordic
Bitcurex ICBit BTC Quick
Bitfloor Mercado Bitcoin FastCash4Bitcoins
Bitmarket Mt Gox Lilion Transfer
Bitme The Rock Nanaimo Gold
Bitstamp Vircurex OKPay
BTC China Virwox
Vendors
ABU Games BTC Buy HealthRX
Bitbrew BTC Gadgets JJ Games
Bitdomain Casascius NZBs R Us
Bitmit Coinabul Silk Road
Bitpay CoinDL WalletBit
Bit Usenet Etsy Yoku
Gambling
Bit Elfin BitZino Gold Game Land
Bitcoin 24/7 BTC Griffin Satoshi Dice
Bitcoin Darts BTC Lucky Seals with Clubs
Bitcoin Kamikaze BTC on Tilt
Bitcoin Minefield Clone Dice
Miscellaneous
Bit Visitor Bitfog CoinAd
Bitcoin Advertisers Bitlaundry Coinapult
Bitcoin Laundry BitMix Wikileaks
Table 1: The various services we interacted with,
grouped by (approximate) type.
public donation address and two one-time addresses gener-
ated for us via their IRC channel.
3.2 From other sources
In addition to our own transactions, many users publicly
claim their own addresses; e.g., charities providing dona-
tion addresses, or LulzSec claiming their address on Twitter.
While we did not attempt to collect all such instances, many
of these tags are conveniently collected at blockchain.info/
tags, including both addresses provided in users’ signatures
for Bitcoin forums, as well as self-submitted tags. We col-
lected all of these tags — over 5,000 in total — keeping in
mind that the ones that were not self-submitted (and even
the ones that were) could be regarded as less reliable than
the ones we collected ourselves.
Finally, we searched through the Bitcoin forums (in par-
ticular, bitcointalk.org) looking for addresses associated
with major thefts, or now-defunct services such as Tradehill
and GLBSE. Again, these sources are less reliable, so we
consequently labeled users only for addresses for which we
could gain some confidence through manual due diligence.
4. ADDRESS CLUSTERING
In this section, we present two heuristics for linking ad-
dresses controlled by the same user, with the goal of collaps-
ing the many addresses seen in the block chain into larger
entities. The first heuristic, in which we treat different ad-
dresses used as inputs to a transaction as being controlled
by the same user, has already been used and explored in pre-
vious work, and exploits an inherent property of the Bitcoin
protocol. The second is new and based on so-called change
addresses; in contrast to the first, it exploits a current id-
iom of use in the Bitcoin network rather than an inherent
property. As such, it is less robust in the face of changing
patterns within the network, but — as we especially see in
Section 5 — it can provide insight into the Bitcoin network
that the first heuristic does not.
4.1 Our heuristics
Heuristic 1.
The first heuristic, in which we link together addresses
used as input to the same transaction, has already been used
many times in previous work [1, 9, 10, 12]. For completeness,
we nevertheless present it here as Heuristic 1: if two (or
more) addresses are used as inputs to the same transaction,
then they are controlled by the same user.
Using this heuristic, we partitioned the network into 5.5
million clusters of users. By naming these clusters — using
the data collection described in Section 3 — we observed that
some of them corresponded to the same user; e.g., there were
20 clusters that we tagged as being controlled by Mt. Gox.
(This is not surprising, as many big services appear to spread
their funds across a number of distinct addresses to minimize
the risk in case any one gets compromised.) Factoring in
“sink” addresses that have to date never sent any bitcoins
(and thus did not get clustered using this heuristic) yields
at most 6,595,564 distinct users, although we consider this
number a quite large upper bound.
Heuristic 2.
Although Heuristic 1 already yields a useful clustering of
users, restricting ourselves to only this heuristic does not tell
the whole story. To further collapse users, our second heuris-
tic focuses on the role of change addresses within the Bitcoin
system. A similar heuristic was explored by Androulaki et
al. [1] (who called them “shadow” addresses), although there
are a number of important differences. In particular, their
definition of shadow addresses relied upon assumptions that
may have held at the time of their work, but no longer hold
at present. For example, they assumed that users rarely is-
sue transactions to two different users, which is a frequent
occurrence today (e.g., payouts from mining pools, or bets
on gambling sites).
One of the defining features of the Bitcoin protocol is the
way that bitcoins must be spent. When the bitcoins re-
deemed as the output of a transaction are spent, they must
be spent all at once: the only way to divide them is through
the use of a change address, in which the excess from the
input address is sent back to the sender. In one idiom of
use, the change address is created internally by the Bitcoin
client and never re-used; as such, a user is unlikely to give
out this change address to other users (e.g., for accepting
payments), and in fact might not even know the address un-
less he inspects the block chain. If we can identify change
addresses, we can therefore potentially cluster not only the
input addresses for a transaction (according to Heuristic 1)
but also the change address and the input user.
Because our heuristic takes advantage of this idiom of use,
rather than an inherent property of the Bitcoin protocol, it
does lack robustness in the face of changing (or adversar-
ial) patterns in the network. Furthermore, it has one very
negative potential consequence: falsely linking even a small
number of change addresses might collapse the entire graph
into large “super-clusters” that are not actually controlled
by a single user (in fact, we see this exact problem occur in
Section 4.2). We therefore focused on designing the safest
heuristic possible, even at the expense of losing some utility
by having a high false negative rate, and acknowledge that
such a heuristic might have to be redesigned or ultimately
discarded if habitual uses of the Bitcoin protocol change sig-
nificantly.
Working off the assumption that a change address has
only one input (again, as it is potentially unknown to its
owner and is not re-used by the client), we first looked at the
outputs of every transaction. If only one of the outputs met
this pattern, then we identified that output as the change
address. If, however, multiple outputs had only one input
and thus the change address was ambiguous, we did not label
any change address for that transaction. We also avoided
certain transactions; e.g., in a coin generation, none of the
outputs are change addresses.
In addition, in custom usages of the Bitcoin protocol it is
possible to specify the change address for a given transac-
tion. Thus far, one common usage of this setting that we
have observed has been to provide a change address that
is in fact the same as the input address. (This usage is
quite common: 23% of all transactions in the first half of
2013 used self-change addresses.) We thus avoid such “self-
change” transactions as well.
To bring all of these behaviors together, we say that an
address is a one-time change address for a transaction if the
following four conditions are met: (1) the address has not
appeared in any previous transaction; (2) the transaction is
not a coin generation; (3) there is no self-change address;
and (4) all the other output addresses in the transaction
have appeared in previous transactions. Heuristic 2 then
says that the one-time change address — if one exists — is
controlled by the same user as the input addresses.
4.2 Refining Heuristic 2
Although effective, Heuristic 2 is more challenging and
significantly less safe than Heuristic 1. In our first attempt,
when we used it as defined above, we identified over 4 million
change addresses. Due to our concern over its safety, we
sought to approximate the false positive rate. To do this
even in the absence of significant ground truth data, we used
the fact that we could observe the behavior of addresses over
time: if an address looked like a one-time change address
at one point in time (where time was measured by block
height), and then at a later time the address was used again,
we considered this a false positive. Stepping through time
in this manner allowed us to identify 555,348 false positives,
or 13% of all labeled change addresses.
We then considered ways of making the heuristic more
conservative. First, however, a manual inspection of some of
these false positives revealed an interesting pattern: many of
them were associated with transactions to and from Satoshi
Dice and other dice games. By looking further into the pay-
out structure of these games, it became clear that these were
not truly false positives, as when coins are sent to Satoshi
Dice, the payout is sent back to the same address. If a
user therefore spent the contents of a one-time change ad-
dress with Satoshi Dice, the address would receive another
input back from Satoshi Dice, which would appear to inval-
idate the “one-timeness” of the address. We therefore chose
to ignore this case, believing that addresses that received
later inputs solely from Satoshi Dice could still be one-time
change addresses. By doing so the false positive rate reduces
to only 1%. We next considered waiting to label an address
as a change address; i.e., waiting to see if it received another
input. Waiting a day drove the false positive rate down to
0.28%; waiting a week drove it down to 0.17%, or only 7,382
false positives total.
Despite all these precautions, when we clustered users
using this modified heuristic, we still ended up with a gi-
ant super-cluster containing the addresses of Mt. Gox, In-
stawallet, BitPay, and Silk Road, among others; in total,
this super-cluster contained 1.6 million addresses. After a
manual inspection of some of the links that led to this super-
cluster, we discovered two problematic patterns. First, es-
pecially within a short window of time, the same change ad-
dress was sometimes used twice. Second, certain addresses
were occasionally used as “self-change” addresses, and then
later used as separate change addresses. We thus further
refined our heuristic by ignoring transactions involved with
either of these types of behavior. For transactions in which
an output address had already received only one input, or
for transactions in which an output address had been previ-
ously used in a self-change transaction, we chose to not tag
anything as the change address. Doing so, and manually re-
moving a handful of other false positives (with no discernible
pattern), we identified 3,540,831 change addresses.
Using this refined Heuristic 2 produces 3,384,179 clusters,
which we were able to again collapse slightly (using our tags)
to 3,383,904 distinct clusters. Of these clusters, we were able
to name 2,197 of them (accounting for over 1.8 million ad-
dresses). Although this might seem like a small fraction,
recall that by participating in 344 transactions we hand-
tagged only 1,070 addresses, and thus Heuristic 2 allowed us
to name 1,600 times more addresses than our own manual
observation provided. Furthermore, as we will argue in Sec-
tion 5, the users we were able to name capture an important
and active slice of the Bitcoin network.
Having finally convinced ourselves of the safety of Heuris-
tic 2, by refining it substantially, and its effectiveness, we use
Heuristic 2 exclusively for the results in the next section.
5. ANALYSIS OF ILLICIT ACTIVITY
Exchanges have essentially become chokepoints in the Bit-
coin economy, in the sense that it is unavoidable to buy into
or cash out of Bitcoin at scale without using an exchange.
While sites like localbitcoins.com and bitcoinary.com do
allow users to avoid exchanges (for the former, by pairing
buyers directly with sellers in their geographic area), the
current and historical volume on these sites does not seem
to be high enough to support cashing out at scale.
In this section, we argue that this centrality presents a
unique problem for criminals: if a thief steals thousands
of bitcoins, this theft is unavoidably visible within the Bit-
coin network, and thus the initial address of the thief is
known and (as most exchanges try to maintain some air of
reputability) he cannot simply transfer the bitcoins directly
from the theft to a known exchange. While he might attempt
to use a mix service to hide the source of the money, we again
argue that these services do not currently have the volume
to launder thousands of bitcoins. As such, we explore in
this section various alternative strategies that thieves have
developed for hiding the source of stolen bitcoins. In par-
ticular, we focus on the effectiveness of Heuristic 2 in de-
anonymizing these flows, and thus in tracking illicitly ob-
tained bitcoins to exchanges (and thus, e.g., providing an
agency with subpoena power the opportunity to learn whose
account was deposited into, and in turn potentially the iden-
tity of the thief). For this to work, we do not need to (and
cannot) account for each and every stolen bitcoin, but rather
need to demonstrate only some flow of bitcoins directly from
the theft to an exchange or other known institution.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of Heuristic 2 in this en-
deavor, we focus on an idiom of use that we call a “peeling
chain.” The usage of this pattern extends well beyond crim-
inal activity, and is seen (for example) in the withdrawals
for many banks and exchanges, as well as in the payouts for
some of the larger mining pools. In a peeling chain, a sin-
gle address begins with a relatively large amount of bitcoins
(e.g., for mining pools it starts with the 25 BTC reward). A
smaller amount is then “peeled” off this larger amount, cre-
ating a transaction in which a small amount is sent to one
address and the remainder is sent to a one-time change ad-
dress. This process is repeated — potentially for hundreds or
thousands of hops — until the larger amount is pared down.
By using Heuristic 2, we are able to track flows of money by
following these change links systematically: at each hop, we
look at the two output addresses in the transaction. If one
of these output addresses is a change address, we can follow
the chain to the next hop by following the change address
(i.e., the next hop is the transaction in which this change
address spends its bitcoins), and can identify the meaning-
ful recipient in the transaction as the other output address
(the “peel”).
Silk Road and Bitcoin Savings & Trust.
One of the most well-known and heavily scrutinized ad-
dresses in Bitcoin’s history is1DkyBEKt— full address: 1Dky-
BEKt5S2GDtv7aQw6rQepAvnsRyHoYM— which is believed to be
associated with Silk Road and was active between January
and September 2012. Starting in January, the address be-
gan to receive large aggregate sums of bitcoins; in the first of
these, the funds of 128 addresses were combined to deposit
10,000 BTC into the 1DkyBEKt address, and many transac-
tions of this type followed. All together, the address received
613,326 BTC in a period of eight months, receiving its last
aggregate deposit on August 16 2012.
Then, starting in August 2012, bitcoins were aggregated
and withdrawn from 1DkyBEKt: first, amounts of 20,000,
19,000, and 60,000 BTC were sent to separate addresses;
later, 100,000 BTC each was sent to two distinct addresses,
150,000 BTC to a third, and 158,336 BTC to a fourth, ef-
fectively emptying the 1DkyBEKt address of all of its funds.
Due to its large balance (at its height, it contained 5% of
all generated bitcoins), as well as the curious nature of its
rapidly accumulated wealth and later dissolution, this ad-
dress has naturally been the subject of heavy scrutiny by
the Bitcoin community. While it is largely agreed that the
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Figure 2: The balance of each major category, rep-
resented as a percentage of total active bitcoins; i.e.,
the bitcoins that are not held in sink addresses.
address is associated with Silk Road (and indeed our clus-
tering heuristic did tag this address as being controlled by
Silk Road), some have theorized that it was the “hot” (i.e.,
active) wallet for Silk Road, and that its dissipation repre-
sents a changing storage structure for the service. Others,
meanwhile, have argued that it was the address belonging
to the user pirate@40, who was responsible for carrying out
the largest Ponzi scheme in Bitcoin history (the investment
scheme Bitcoin Savings & Trust, which is now the subject
of a lawsuit brought by the SEC [11]).
To see where the funds from this address went, and if they
ended up with any known services, we first plotted the bal-
ance of each of the major categories of services, as seen in
Figure 2. Looking at this figure, it is clear that when the
address was dissipated, the resulting funds were not sent en
masse to any major services, as the balances of the other
categories do not change significantly. To nevertheless at-
tempt to find out where the funds did go, we turn to the
traffic analysis described above.
In particular, we focus on the last activity of the 1DkyBEKt
address, when it deposited 158,336 BTC into a single ad-
dress. This address then peeled off 50,000 BTC each to
two separate addresses, leaving 58,336 BTC for a third ad-
dress; each of these addresses then began a peeling chain,
which we followed using the methodology described above
(i.e., at each hop we continued along the chain by following
the change address, and considered the other output address
to be a meaningful recipient of the money). After following
100 hops along each chain, we observed peels to the services
listed in Table 2.
In this table, we see that, although a longitudinal look
at the balances of major services did not reveal where the
money went, following these chains revealed that bitcoins
were in fact sent to a variety of services. The overall bal-
ance was not highly affected, however, as the amounts sent
were relatively small and spread out over a handful of trans-
actions. Furthermore, while our analysis does not itself re-
veal the owner of 1DkyBEKt, the flow of bitcoins from this
address to known services demonstrates the prevalence of
these services (54 out of 300 peels went to exchanges alone)
and provides the potential for further de-anonymization: the
evidence that the deposited bitcoins were the direct result
First Second Third
Service Peels BTC Peels BTC Peels BTC
Bitcoin-24 1 2 3 124
Bitcoin Central 2 2
Bitcoin.de 1 4
Bitmarket 1 1
Bitstamp 5 97 1 1
BTC-e 1 250
CA VirtEx 1 3 1 10 3 22
Mercado Bitcoin 1 9
Mt. Gox 11 492 14 70 5 35
OKPay 2 151 1 125
Instawallet 7 39 5 135 2 43
WalletBit 1 1
Bitzino 2 1
Seals with Clubs 1 8
Coinabul 1 29
Medsforbitcoin 3 10
Silk Road 4 28 5 102
Table 2: Tracking bitcoins from 1DkyBEKt. Along
the first 100 hops of the first, second, and third
peeling chains resulting from the withdrawal of
158,336 BTC, we consider the number of peels seen
to each service, as well as the total number of bit-
coins (rounded to the nearest integer value) sent in
these peels. The services are separated into the cate-
gories of exchanges, wallets, gambling, and vendors.
of either a Ponzi scheme or the sale of drugs might motivate
Mt. Gox or any exchange (e.g., in response to a subpoena)
to reveal the account owner corresponding to the deposit
address in the peel, and thus provide information to link the
address to a real-world user.
Tracking thefts.
To ensure that our analysis could be applied more gener-
ally, we turned finally to a broader class of criminal activity
in the Bitcoin network: thefts. Thefts are in fact quite com-
mon within Bitcoin: almost every major service has been
hacked and had bitcoins (or, in the case of exchanges, other
currencies) stolen, and some have shut down as a result.
To begin, we used a list of major Bitcoin thefts found at
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=83794. Some
of the thefts did not have public transactions (i.e., ones we
could identify and study in the block chain), so we limited
our attention to the ones that did. For each theft, we first
found the specific set of transactions that represented the
theft; i.e., the set of transactions in which the sender was
the service and the recipient was the thief. Starting with
these transactions, we did a preliminary manual inspection
of the transactions that followed to determine their approx-
imate type: we considered aggregations, in which bitcoins
were moved from several addresses into a single one; fold-
ing, in which some of the aggregated addresses were not
clearly associated with the theft; splits, in which a large
amount of bitcoins was split among two or more addresses;
and finally peeling chains, in which smaller amounts were
peeled off from a succession of one-time change addresses.
Our results are summarized in Table 3.
Theft BTC Date Movement Exchanges?
MyBitcoin 4019 Jun 2011 A/P/S Yes
Linode 46,648 Mar 2012 A/P/F Yes
Betcoin 3171 Mar 2012 F/A/P Yes
Bitcoinica 18,547 May 2012 P/A Yes
Bitcoinica 40,000 Jul 2012 P/A/S Yes
Bitfloor 24,078 Sep 2012 P/A/P Yes
Trojan 3257 Oct 2012 F/A No
Table 3: Tracking thefts. For each theft, we list (ap-
proximately) how many bitcoins were stolen, when
the theft occurred, how the money moved after it
was stolen, and whether we saw any bitcoins sent
to known exchanges. For the movement, we use A
to mean aggregation, P to mean a peeling chain, S
to mean a split, and F to mean folding, and list the
various movements in the order they occurred.
Briefly, the movement of the stolen money ranged from
quite sophisticated layering and mixing to simple and easy to
follow. Examining thefts therefore provides another demon-
stration of the potential for anonymity provided by Bitcoin,
and the ways in which current usage falls short of this poten-
tial. For the thieves who used the more complex strategies,
we saw little opportunity to track the flow of bitcoins (or at
least do so with any confidence that ownership was staying
the same), but for the thieves that did not there seemed to
be ample opportunity to track the stolen money directly to
an exchange.
One of the easiest thefts to track was from Betcoin, an
early gambling site that was shut down after its server was
hacked on April 11 2012 and 3,171 BTC were stolen. The
stolen bitcoins then sat in the thief’s address until March
15 2013 (when the bitcoin exchange rate began soaring),
when they were aggregated with other small addresses into
one large address that then began a peeling chain. After
10 hops, we saw a peel go to Bitcoin-24, and in another
10 hops we saw a peel go to Mt. Gox; in total, we saw
374.49 BTC go to known exchanges, all directly off the main
peeling chain, which originated directly from the addresses
known to belong to the thief.
In contrast, some of the other thieves used more sophisti-
cated strategies to attempt to hide the flow of money; e.g.,
for the Bitfloor theft, we observed that large peels off several
initial peeling chains were then aggregated, and the peel-
ing process was repeated. Nevertheless, by manually fol-
lowing this peel-and-aggregate process to the point that the
later peeling chains began, we systematically followed these
later chains and again observed peels to multiple known ex-
changes: the third peel off one such chain was 191.09 BTC
to Mt. Gox, and in total we saw 661.12 BTC sent to three
popular exchanges (Mt. Gox, BTC-e, and Bitstamp).
Even the thief we had the most difficulty tracking, who
stole bitcoins by installing a trojan on the computers of in-
dividual users, seemed to realize the difficulty of cashing out
at scale. Although we were unable to confidently track the
flow of the stolen money that moved, most of the stolen
money did not in fact move at all: of the 3,257 BTC stolen
to date, 2,857 BTC was still sitting in the thief’s address,
and has been since November 2012.
With these thefts, our ability to track the stolen money
provides evidence that even the most motivated Bitcoin users
(i.e., criminals) are engaging in idioms of use that allow us to
erode their anonymity. While one might argue that thieves
could easily thwart our analysis, our observation is that —
at least at the time we performed our analysis — none of the
criminals we studied seem to have taken such precautions.
We further argue that the fairly direct flow of bitcoins from
the point of theft to the deposit with an exchange provides
some evidence that using exchanges to cash out at scale
is inevitable, as otherwise thieves presumably would have
avoided this less anonymous method of cashing out. Thus,
Bitcoin does not — again, at the time we performed our anal-
ysis — seem to provide a particularly easy or effective way
to transact large volumes of illicitly obtained money.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we presented a longitudinal characterization
of the Bitcoin network, focusing on the growing gap — due
to certain idioms of use — between the potential anonymity
available in the Bitcoin protocol design and the actual anonymity
that is currently achieved by users. To accomplish this task,
we developed a new clustering heuristic based on change
addresses, allowing us to cluster addresses belonging to the
same user. Then, using a small number of transactions la-
beled through our own empirical interactions with various
services, we identify major institutions. Even our relatively
small experiment demonstrates that this approach can shed
considerable light on the structure of the Bitcoin economy,
how it is used, and those organizations who are party to it.
Although our work examines the current gap between ac-
tual and potential anonymity, one might naturally wonder —
given that our new clustering heuristic is not fully robust in
the face of changing behavior — how this gap will evolve over
time, and what users can do to achieve stronger anonymity
guarantees. We posit that to completely thwart our heuris-
tics would require a significant effort on the part of the user,
and that this loss of usability is unlikely to appeal to all
but the most motivated users (such as criminals). Never-
theless, we leave a quantitative analysis of this hypothesis
as an interesting open problem.
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